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The Q-theory of investment says that a firm’s investment rate should rise with its Q. We argue
here that this theory also explains why some firms buy other firms. We find that 
1.  A firm’s merger and acquisition (M&A) investment responds to its Q  more -- by a factor of 2.6 --
than its direct investment does, probably because M&A investment is a high fixed cost and a low
marginal adjustment cost activity, 
2.  The typical firm wastes some cash on M&As, but not on internal investment, i.e., the "Free-Cash
Flow" story works, but explains a small fraction of mergers only, and 
3.  The merger waves of 1900 and the 1920’s, ‘80s, and ‘90s were a response to profitable reallocation
opportunities, but the ‘60s wave was probably caused by something else.
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The Q-theory of investment says that a ﬁrm’s investment rate should rise with its
Q. We argue here that this theory also explains why some ﬁrms buy other ﬁrms. We
ﬁnd that
1. A ﬁrm’s merger and acquisition (M&A) investment responds to its Q more —
by a factor of 2.6 — than its direct investment does, probably because M&A
investment is a high ﬁxed cost and a low marginal adjustment cost activity,
2. The typical ﬁrm wastes some cash on M&As, but not on internal investment,
i.e., the “Free-Cash Flow” story works, but explains a small fraction of mergers
only, and
3. The merger waves of 1900 and the 1920’s, ‘80s, and ‘90s were a response to
proﬁtable reallocation opportunities, but the ‘60s wave was probably caused by
something else.
Two distinct used-capital markets.–Used equipment and structures sometimes
trade unbundled in that ﬁrm 1 buys a machine or building from ﬁrm 2, but ﬁrm 2
continues to exist. At other times, ﬁrm 1 buys ﬁrm 2 and thereby gets to own all
of ﬁrm 2’s capital. In both markets, the traded capital gets a new owner. In a sale
of used “disassembled” capital, the capital also gets a new manager, whereas in the
M&A market, capital gets a new manager when a merger entails a restructuring.
Such a merger is reallocative in the same sense that a used capital trade is.
Mergers as used-capital trades.–Our model treats M&As like used-capital-market
transactions. This seems apt, since trading volume in the two markets for used capital
— bundled and disassembled — moves together. Figure 1 shows this fact. It plots
acquired capital and direct purchases of used capital among exchange-listed ﬁrms as
percentages of their investment. The series cover all ﬁrms common to the University
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Figure 1: Used and Acquired Capital as Percentages of Total Investment, 1971-2000
of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database and Standard
and Poor’s Compustat.1 The two series do not overlap in coverage, and so they add
up to the fraction of investment spent on buying used capital. This fraction was 10
percent in 1975, and a much higher 43.5 percent in 2000. The correlation coeﬃcient
between the two series is 0.45. Clearly, the merger waves of the ‘80s and ‘90s coincided
with waves of trading disassembled used capital.
Prior evidence.–High-Q ﬁrms usually buy low-Q ﬁrms. Gregor Andrade, Mark
Mitchell and Erik Staﬀord (2001) report that in more than two-thirds of all mergers
since 1973, the acquirer’s Q exceeded the target’s Q. And Henri Servaes (1991) ﬁnds
that total takeover returns (deﬁned as the abnormal increase in the combined values
of the merging parties) are larger when the target has a low Q and if the bidder had
ah i g hQ. Thus mergers are a channel through which capital ﬂows to better projects
and better management, and our model reﬂects that fact.
1Capital sales include property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 107). Acquisitions include
funds used for and costs related to the purchase of another company in the current year or an
acquisition in a prior year that was carried over to the current year (item 129). Investment is the
sum of acquired capital (item 129) and direct capital expenditures (item 128). We compute the
ratios in Figure 1 after summing each data item across active ﬁrms in each year.
2I. Model
A ﬁrm’s state of technology is z and its capital stock is K. Its production function
is
output = zK. (1)
The parameter z follows the Markov process
Pr{zt+1 ≤ z
0 | zt = z} = F (z
0,z), (2)
and it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
Markets for K.–Firms can buy new or disassembled used capital at a price of
unity. The cost of disassembly is 1 − s per unit of capital, and any ﬁrm that disas-
sembles its K gets a salvage value of s<1 per unit of K.T h eﬁrm can also place
itself on the M&A market where all acquired capital trades at a common price of q
per unit. If the salvage and the acquired capital markets are both open, we must
have q = s, and this is what we shall assume.
No markets for z.– The ﬁrm must accept whatever z−draw that nature endows
it with each period.
Growth of capacity.–Let X be the ﬁrm’s direct investment in capital (new or used
but unbundled) and Y its acquisitions of bundled capital. Next period, its capital
s t o c kw i l lb e
K
0 =( 1− δ)K + X + Y. (3)
Costs of growth.–Aside from the payment for X and Y ,t h eﬁrm also faces the
following foregone-output cost of growth:
C (x,y)K, where x =
X
K




Merger gains.–The ﬁrm transfers its z to all new and all used capital that it
buys. The joint gains to a merger are thus largest when the target’s z is low, and
the buyer’s z is high. Let the bidder’s state be (z1,K 1) and let the target’s state be
(z2,K 2). The output of the combined ﬁrm would be z1 (K1 + K2), which is higher
than the sum of the two ﬁrms’ pre-merger outputs by the amount (z1 − z2)K2.
The Q equation.– Because (1) and (4) are homogeneous of degree one in K, X,
and Y , the aggregation condition (2.8) of Fumio Hayashi and Tohru Inoue (1991)
holds. The value of K inside a ﬁrm is of the form Q(z)K. The price of new capital is
unity, and the price of used capital is q<1. A unit of K has a proﬁto fz−C (x,y)−
x − qy, and a market value of
Q(z)= m a x
x≥0,y≥0{z − C (x,y) − x − qy +( 1− δ + x + y)Q
∗ (z)}, (5)
3where Q∗ (z) is the discounted expected present value of capital tomorrow given the
ﬁrm’s z today. Since the ﬁrm has the option of selling its capital in the next period









Interior maxima.–At an interior maximum, the optimal x and y satisfy the ﬁrst
order conditions
c1 (x,y)=Q
∗ (z) − 1. (7)
and
c2 (x,y)=Q
∗ (z) − q. (8)
If z is positively autocorrelated, Q∗ is increasing in z,a n dh i g h - z ﬁrms will grow
faster and, if there are no ﬁxed costs of investment, use both x and y to achieve that
growth. If we control for Q∗, K does not matter. That is, a large ﬁrm grows as easily
as a small one, and no optimal ﬁrm size exists — just optimal growth.





c(x,0) if y =0 .
This cost is per unit of K, and therefore returns to scale remain constant. Let i = x+y
be the gross investment rate in eﬃciency units. A low-i ﬁrm will avoid the cost φ
by setting y =0and using only x, whereas a high-i ﬁrm will use both margins. The
value of i,c a l li ti∗,a tw h i c ht h eﬁrm is indiﬀerent between buying in the acquisitions
market and staying out of it, solves for i the equation
i + c(i,0) = φ +m i n
y {(i − y)+qy + c(i − y,y)}. (9)
The left-hand side of (9) is lower when i is small, and the right-hand side is lower
when i is high. Of course, i itself depends on the ﬁrm’s z.
Disappearance of ﬁrms.–A ﬁrm may disappear either by exiting and disassem-
bling its capital, or by being acquired. Either way, it gets q per unit of K.L e tze be
the point of indiﬀerence between staying in business and exiting. Then
Q(ze)=q.
Four regions for z.–Figure 2 portrays a steady state in which the distribution
of z over ﬁrms replicates itself period after period. Sustaining such a steady state
requires an entry process as modeled by Hugo A. Hopenhayn (1982). Our focus is
on the fate of the incumbents. Each period, ﬁrms with z’s below ze dissolve or are
4z 
Frequency distribution of 
firm-efficiencies,  z  




over   Invest  
internally: 
x>0, y=0  
x >  y > 0 
z
*  ze  zO 
y >  x > 0 
Invest internally 
and externally  
Figure 2: The Four Regions of z
acquired. In the region between ze and z∗ ﬁr m sr e m a i ni nt h em a r k e tb u ti n v e s to n l y
in x because the ﬁxed cost φ deters them from setting a positive y.B e y o n dz∗ (the
value of z that corresponds to i∗)t h e ya l s os e ty>0, and beyond the “overtaking”
level zO, y exceeds x.
Investment-expansion path.–Figure 3 shows the expansion path for x and y as the
eﬃciency-units-investment rate i, represented by the parallel dashed iso-investment
lines, rises. At i∗, x drops from i∗ to x∗,a n dy jumps from zero to ymin. The ﬁgure
reﬂects the assumption that cy is small relative to cx, so that the share of y in the
ﬁrm’s investment portfolio grows, and the expansion path approaches the 450 line.
At the overtaking point, x = y = iO/2.B e y o n diO,i nF i g u r e3 ,y exceeds x.
Engel curves for x and y.–Figure 4 shows how investment in x and y varies with
i. The two schedules add up to the 45o line. When i reaches iO, y overtakes x.
Evidence on overtaking.–The prediction of Figure 4 is conﬁrmed by the evidence
in Figure 5. Between 1971 and 2000, small expansions did, indeed, come mainly
through x, while large expansions came mainly through y. The vertical axis measures
the HP-ﬁltered means of x and y for ﬁrms that fall within each percentage point of
the range of i.2 Overtaking occurs at iO =1 .12,w h i c h ,a f t e rd e p r e c i a t i o n ,i sr o u g h l y
a doubling of capacity. Data on individual years (not shown) indicate that iO has
2In Figure 5, we pool 118,127 observations from 1971-2000. The sample thins out as i∗ gets large:
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Figure 3: The Expansion Path of x and y, as the Gross Investment-Rate, i = x + y,
Rises
fallen over the past two decades from 1.43 in 1980, to 1.09 in 1989, and to just 0.5 in
1998. This suggests that φ has also been falling.
The M&A deﬂator.–The acquirer’s y is its M&A spending divided by q.I nt h e
model, q is the targets’ market values divided by their K’s. A measure of q is market-
to-book value of the acquired ﬁrms but, since ﬁrms usually write down the capital on
their books as quickly as possible so as to bring the depreciation allowances forward,
their market-to-book ratios are often much higher than unity. This is true for each
subgroup of ﬁr m sp i c t u r e di nF i g u r e2 .I nF i g u r e6w ep l o tt h ea v e r a g eQ’s for these
groups, while pooling the middle two into a single “x ≥ y” group, and we denote
these averages by ¯ q, ¯ Qx>y,a n d ¯ Qy>x respectively. All three averages stay well above
1, probably because the targets’ books underreport their capital. If so, the ¯ qt series
plotted in Figure 6 badly overestimates the price of used capital on the acquisitions
Another 182 observations, not shown in Figure 5, involve x + y>2.5.W eu s eb o o kv a l u eo fa s s e t s
(Compustat item 6) in the previous year to proxy for K, and linearly interpolate between missing
points in the range of i∗ before ﬁltering. We interpolated between 5 annual averages in building x
and 10 annual averages in building y. In all cases, the interpolations involved x + y>1.5.













Figure 4: The Point of Overtaking, iO
market, and we prefer not to use it as a deﬂator. Instead we assume in Figure 5 and
in the regression analysis below that a dollar spent on x buys the same eﬃciency
units of capital as a dollar spent on y.
II. Estimates of Investment and Acquisitions Equations
Assume that c(x,y) is additively separable. Then (7) and (8) are of the form
x = f (Q∗), and y = g (Q∗ − q). The Q’s may all be biased upward, but Qj − ¯ q
should still measure ﬁrm j’s incentive to acquire the capital from other ﬁrms at the


















1 (Qj,t−1 − ¯ qt−1)+α
y
2t,
where t is a linear time trend. The model predicts that αx
1 and α
y
1 should be positive.
Table 1 presents the results for our panel of pooled observations from 1971-2000. We
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Figure 5: Direct Capital Purchases, x, and Acquired Capital, y, by Investment Ratio,












Notes: The table presents estimates for Eq. 10
with T-statistics in parentheses. The regressions
include dummy variables for 2-digit SICs (not
reported).
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Figure 6: Q’s by Investment Subgroup, 1972-2000
use the market-to-book ratio for Q.3 For ¯ qt we use average market-to-book value of
disappearing ﬁrms — the series plotted in Figure 6.
The results support the Q-theory. Hayashi had estimated the eﬀect of Q on
investment at 0.045. Our dependent variables are multiplied by 100. Our estimate
of the eﬀect of Q on x is one-sixth as large as Hayashi’s, perhaps because we use
total ﬁrm assets as the denominator (K) rather than the stock of durable equipment
and structures. More to the point, our estimate of the eﬀect of Q − ¯ q on y is highly
signiﬁcant and nearly three times the coeﬃcient-estimate of Q in the x equation.
A. Which Way Does “Free” Cash Flow?
A ﬁrm’s manager may try to pursue his own objectives — growing the size of his
3To compute market values from the Compustat ﬁl e s ,w es t a r tw i t ht h ev a l u eo fc o m m o ne q u i t y
at current share prices (the product of items 24 and 25), and then add in the book value of preferred
stock (item 130) and short- and long-term debt (items 34 and 9). Book values are computed similarly,
but use the book value of common equity (item 60) rather than the market value. We omitted ﬁrms
with negative values for net common equity from the plot since they imply negative market to book
ratios, and eliminated observations with market-to-book values in excess of 100, since many of these
were likely to be serious data errors.
9ﬁrm, for example — at shareholders’ expense. Direct investment cannot expand a
manager’s empire as fast as a merger can, and Michael C. Jensen (1986) argues that
managers of ﬁrms with excess cash on hand are more likely to spend it on acquisitions
than to pay it out in dividends, even if an acquisition has a negative net present value.
Do ﬁrms spend their extra cash mergers? It seems so. We add cash (Compustat
item 1) normalized by ﬁrm capital (again proxied by item 6) to the regressions de-
scribed in (10). The results are in Table 2. Cash has little eﬀect on x, but a positive,
signiﬁcant eﬀect on y. Still, Q retains the lion’s share of explanatory power.













Notes: The table presents estimates for Eq. 10
with the ratio of cash to total ﬁrm assets as an
additional regressor, with T-statistics in paren-
theses. The regressions include dummy variables
for 2-digit SICs (not reported).
III. Merger Waves as Reallocation Waves
If ﬁrms all had the same z, Q would equal q, a n dn oM & A ’ sw o u l dt a k ep l a c e .
M&A’s should rise, says the model, when the interﬁrm dispersion of Q is high. We
now ask: Was Q more dispersed during merger waves? We conﬁrm this in two
diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst test is summarized by Figure 7, which shows that Qy>x − q
leads movements in acquisitions.4 The correlation between Qy>x − q at the end of
year t and acquisitions in the following year, which is the timing shown in the Figure
7, is 0.12, but the correlation rises to 0.22 if we lag Qy>x − q by another period, and
rises to 0.31 if we lag it yet again.
4We project mergers for 2001 by observing that their value fell by 57 percent between 2000 and
2001 (Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 2002) and by assuming that ﬁrm assets in our Compustat sample
grew at the same rate as GDP between the second quarters of 2000 and 2001.
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Figure 7: Acquired Capital and the Dispersion of Q, 1975-2001
Our second, and less direct test is in Figure 8. The Compustat covers too few
book values before 1975 to allow a reliable estimate of the dispersion of Q before then.
Instead, we infer the dispersion of Q in year t<1998 by computing the standard
deviation of the year-1998 Q’s among ﬁrms of vintage t,a n dt h e nr e p e a t i n gt h i s
exercise for each t between 1890 and 1998.I ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fe n t r a n t s ’Q’s is more
dispersed in years when the market at large has more dispersion of Q,a n di ft h ez
process is fairly persistent, this estimate will provide a useful rough guide to waves
of dispersion of Q. But because high-z ﬁrms are more likely to survive, our estimator
is biased increasingly towards zero the older the vintage of the ﬁrms.
Our estimate of Q-dispersion is the dashed line in Figure 8. This HP-ﬁltered series
is indeed upward sloping as a function of vintage. The solid line in Figure 8 shows
the HP-ﬁltered acquisition series as a fraction of total capitalization, as a function of
time.5 Thus the two series derive from two diﬀerent populations. The solid line is a
5The dashed line in Figure 8 is reproduced from Figure 2 in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001b, pp.
338, 340). The solid line is based primarily on merger data from CRSP for 1926-1998, and from work
sheets for the manufacturing and mining sectors underlying Ralph L. Nelson (1959) for 1890-1930.
The series includes the market value of targets acquired by exchange-listed ﬁrms in the year prior to
merger. Market values after 1925 are from CRSP. Before that, they are from our extension of CRSP
11Year
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Figure 8: Acquired Capital and the Dispersion of Q by Vintage, 1890-1998
historical series, whereas the dashed line is a vintage representation of the 1998 cross
section. Both lines may trend upward for reasons that the model leaves out, but even
the detrended series have a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.64! But for the “hubris” wave
of the 1960’s, each merger wave was preceded by a rise in the dispersion of Q.T h u s
the waves of 1900, the 1920s, 1980s and 1990s were probably reallocation waves.
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